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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE ANTI-COMPETITIVE POTENTIAL OF CROSS-MARKET
MERGERS IN HEALTH CARE

JAIME S. KING* AND ERIN C. FUSE BROWN**
ABSTRACT
Health care consolidation in the United States has been widespread at all
levels and across all entities. This consolidation has extended beyond horizontal
mergers of hospitals or other providers to include out-of-market mergers, or
cross-market mergers. Cross-market mergers include the merger or acquisition
of any health care entity that does not directly compete with the acquiring entity
in the same product or geographic market. Antitrust enforcers have historically
had little in the way of market theory, economic models, or empirical data to
inform their analyses on the potential impacts of cross-market mergers on
competition. However, recent developments in economic theory and empirical
studies now offer evidence that cross-market mergers can, in some instances,
harm competition and drive price increases in health care markets when a
common insurer exists across those markets. This article aims to start a
discussion among the health policy and antitrust communities about the
potential for cross-market acquisitions to harm competition, whether existing
antitrust laws could theoretically support a challenge to a cross-market
acquisition, and the practical challenges to doing so. This article will argue that
health policy analysts, antitrust enforcers, and academics should begin to
consider the anti-competitive potential of cross-market acquisitions and develop
a means to analyze them both legally and economically.

*Jaime S. King, J.D., Ph.D., is a Professor of Law, UC Hastings College of the Law; Associate
Dean and Co-Director, UCSF/UC Hastings Consortium on Law, Science & Health Policy;
Executive Editor, The Source on HealthCare Price & Competition.
**Erin C. Fuse Brown, J.D., M.P.H., is an Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University
College of Law; Faculty Member, Georgia State University Center of Law, Health & Society. The
authors would like to thank Tim Greaney and all the presenters and attendees at Saint Louis
University School of Law’s 29th Annual Health Law Symposium: Coping with Health Care Market
Concentration for their insightful comments, and Alexandra Montague, UC Hastings College of
the Law J.D. Candidate 2019, for her excellent research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last several decades, the U.S. health care system has experienced
unprecedented provider, insurer, and pharmaceutical company consolidation. 1
This consolidation generated significant concerns among consumers, employers,
health services researchers, and government entities, especially in light of everrising prices in all facets of health care. 2 Unfortunately, these concerns proved
warranted: The U.S. health care pricing problem is largely a provider market
power problem. 3 Within the same geographic area, prices for health care
services can vary up to 60% for inpatient services and up to 100% for outpatient
services between the highest- and lowest-priced hospitals. 4 Further, health
services research demonstrates that provider market power drives these
variations in price, rather than differences in quality, payor mix, demographics,
or health of the patient population. 5 In other words, higher-price providers rarely

1. Martin Gaynor et al., Making Health Care Markets Work: Competition Policy for Health
Care, 317 JAMA 1313, 1313–14 (2017).
2. See ERIN C. FUSE BROWN, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, STATE
STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS RISING PRICES CAUSED BY HEALTH CARE CONSOLIDATIONS 1 (Sept.
2017), http://www.nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Consolidation-Report.pdf; see also
Robert Berenson, Acknowledging the Elephant: Moving Market Power and Prices to the Center of
Health Policy, HEALTH AFF. BLOG: FOLLOWING THE ACA (June 3, 2014), http://healthaffairs.org/
blog/2014/06/03/acknowledging-the-elephant-moving-market-power-and-prices-to-the-center-ofhealth-policy/; Health Care Market Consolidations: Impacts on Costs, Quality and Access, 20152016 Leg., 413th Sess. 1–2 (Cal. 2016) (statement of Paul B. Ginsburg), https://www.brookings.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Ginsburg-California-Senate-Health-Mar-16-1.pdf.
3. See, e.g., PAUL B. GINSBURG, CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, WIDE
VARIATION IN HOSPITAL AND PHYSICIAN PAYMENT RATES EVIDENCE OF PROVIDER MARKET
POWER 6–7 (Nov. 2010), http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/1162/1162.pdf; CHAPIN WHITE ET
AL., CTR. FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYS. CHANGE, HIGH AND VARYING PRICES FOR PRIVATELY
INSURED PATIENTS UNDERSCORE HOSPITAL MARKET POWER 1 (Sept. 2013), http://www.hs
change.org/CONTENT/1375/1375.pdf; Robert A. Berenson et al., The Growing Power of Some
Providers to Win Steep Payment Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy Remedies May Be
Needed, 31 HEALTH AFF. 973, 973 (2012); Berenson, supra note 2; see also FUSE BROWN, supra
note 2, at 2.
4. WHITE ET AL., supra note 3, at 2.
5. See, e.g., MARTHA COAKLEY, MASS. OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN., EXAMINATION OF
HEALTH CARE COST TRENDS AND COST DRIVERS: REPORT FOR ANNUAL PUBLIC HEARING 2
(2011), http://www.mass.gov/ago/docs/healthcare/2011-hcctd-full.pdf; Joseph P. Newhouse &
Alan M. Garber, Geographic Variation in Health Care Spending in the United States: Insights from
an Institute of Medicine Report, 310 JAMA 1227, 1227–28 (2013) (“[P]rice variation is responsible
for an estimated 70% of the total geographic variation in spending among privately insured persons.
Variation in wage levels and variation in the quantity of services delivered are almost equally
responsible for the remaining estimated 30% of spending variation.”); Zack Cooper et al., The Price
Ain’t Right? Hospital Prices and Health Spending on the Privately Insured 3, 33 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21815, 2015), http://www.nber.org/papers/w21815
(concluding that hospital market structure, that is, the degree of competition in the market, is
strongly associated with hospital prices); GINSBURG, supra note 3, at 7.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

THE ANTI-COMPETITIVE POTENTIAL OF CROSS-MARKET MERGERS

45

provide better care or treat patients with more complicated diagnoses; they
simply have more market leverage. 6
Health care consolidation has been widespread at all levels and across all
entities. Initially, hospitals, individual physicians, and provider groups merged
horizontally with direct competitors. 7 Next, hospital systems formed and began
acquiring additional hospitals, while physician practice groups began to form
larger group practices. 8 In more recent years, consolidation has extended beyond
horizontal mergers of hospitals or physician organizations to include nonhorizontal, or “cross-market mergers.” 9 Cross-market mergers include the
merger or acquisition of any health care entity that does not directly compete
with the acquiring entity in the same product or geographic market. 10 Crossmarket mergers can include the acquisition of a physician organization by a
hospital system (commonly referred to as vertical health care integration), the
purchase of a local community hospital in a rural or suburban area by a hospital
system in a major city, or the acquisition of a single-specialty physician group
by a larger provider organization in a different market. 11 This article will focus
on geographic cross-market mergers in which a merger occurs between health
care entities in different geographic markets.
Modern health care mergers often involve horizontal, vertical, and crossmarket integration of providers, and in some instances the integration of an
insurance entity as well. 12 This multifaceted combination of competitors and
market complements greatly complicates antitrust analysis. Unfortunately,
antitrust enforcers have had little in the way of market theory, economic models,
or empirical data to inform their analyses on the potential impacts of geographic
6. See, e.g., COAKLEY, supra note 5; GINSBURG, supra note 3, at 2–3.
7. See GINSBURG, supra note 3, at 7; Kelly J. Devers et al., Hospitals’ Negotiating Leverage
with Health Plans: How and Why Has It Changed? 38 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 419, 427 (2003).
8. See GINSBURG, supra note 3, at 7.
9. See Leemore Dafny, Kate Ho & Robin S. Lee, The Price Effects of Cross-Market Hospital
Mergers 29–30 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22106, 2016), http://www.n
ber.org/papers/w22106 (revised June 2017).
10. See, e.g., Gregory S. Vistnes & Yianis Sarafidis, Cross-Market Hospital Mergers: A
Holistic Approach, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 253, 254, 289 (2013); Joe Cantlupe, New Scrutiny for
Hospital Mergers, NEW ENG. J. MED. CATALYST (Nov. 29, 2016), https://catalyst.nejm.org/scru
tiny-hospital-cross-market-mergers/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2017).
11. See David A. Argue & Scott D. Stein, Cross-Market Health Care Provider Mergers: The
Next Enforcement Frontier 30 ANTITRUST 25, 25 (2015).
12. Prior to the 1982 Merger Guidelines and their 1984 revisions, courts divided nonhorizontal mergers into vertical and conglomerate (which this article refers to as cross-market)
mergers. ROBERT S. SCHLOSSBERG, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: UNDERSTANDING THE
ANTITRUST ISSUES 475–76 (Am. Bar Ass’n, 3d ed. 2008). The Supreme Court has defined a
conglomerate merger as “one in which there are no economic relationships between the acquiring
and acquired firm,” while lower courts and commentators often label non-horizontal and nonvertical mergers as conglomerates. Id. at 475 (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Proctor & Gamble
Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 n.2 (1967)).
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cross-market mergers on competition in health care. In antitrust circles, the
assumption has always been that geographic cross-market mergers, by
definition, were not anti-competitive because the merging entities did not
compete against one another. 13 However, recent developments in economic
theory and empirical studies now offer evidence that geographic cross-market
mergers can harm competition and drive price increases in health care markets
under certain circumstances. 14 While these findings, accompanied by anecdotal
reports from insurance companies claiming that cross-market provider mergers
were contributing to higher reimbursement rates, have piqued the interest of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), antitrust
enforcers have yet to challenge a cross-market health care merger. 15
This article aims to start a discussion among the health policy and antitrust
communities about the potential for cross-market acquisitions to harm
competition, whether existing antitrust laws could theoretically support a
challenge to a cross-market acquisition, and the practical challenges to doing so.
This article examines the applicability of the emerging economic models and
empirical evidence on geographic cross-market mergers in health care for
antitrust enforcement purposes, presents the case that antitrust enforcers should
consider these theories in evaluating cross-market mergers, and discusses the
attendant challenges of doing so. Part I describes geographic cross-market
mergers and the forces that led to their rise in health care markets. Part II traces
the historical evolution of health care antitrust merger enforcement as it adapted
to changes in the economic evidence of health care market dynamics. Part III
outlines the theoretical model and empirical economic evidence of how
geographic cross-market mergers can lead to anti-competitive price increases.
Part IV sets forth the legal foundations for bringing a cross-market merger
challenge and then identifies areas where further economic and legal analysis is
needed. The article concludes that health policy analysts, antitrust enforcers, and
academics should begin to consider the anti-competitive potential of geographic
cross-market acquisitions and develop a means to analyze them both legally and
economically in a much-needed effort to avoid further market consolidation and
price increases in health care.

13. See Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 10, at 254–55.
14. Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 2, 29–30; Matthew S. Lewis & Kevin E. Pflum, Hospital
Systems and Bargaining Power: Evidence from Out-of-Market Acquisitions, 48 RAND J. ECON.
579, 603–04 (2017).
15. See Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opening Remarks at the Fed.
Trade Comm’n & Dept. of Justice Workshop: Examining Healthcare Competition 6 (Feb. 24, 2015)
(transcript available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/618591/tran
script-day1.pdf).
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I. CROSS-MARKET MERGERS
Cross-market mergers in health care involve the merger of health care
entities that do not operate in the same geographic or product markets. 16 This
article will use the term “cross-market” to describe health care acquisitions
across geographic markets, regardless of whether the entities offer the same or
different products. For example, the merger of hospitals in different counties or
the acquisition by a hospital system of a home-health agency in a different
metropolitan area would be such a geographic cross-market merger. Under the
broad definition, cross-market mergers also include so-called vertical
acquisitions of physicians by hospital systems because the two entities offer
different products (physician versus hospital services). 17 However, because the
early data on cross-market mergers focused on geographic cross-market
mergers, this article will also focus on this subset of cross-market mergers,
referring to mergers among hospitals and physicians as “vertical” to reflect the
separate literature regarding hospital-physician mergers. 18 Cross-market (and
vertical) mergers can be contrasted with horizontal or within-market health care
mergers that compete in both the same geographic and product markets, such as
the consolidation of two hospitals located in the same metropolitan area into a
single hospital system.
Cross-market mergers are increasingly common. From 2000 to 2010,
roughly one-third of hospital mergers involved cross-market acquisitions. 19
According to another calculation, between 2000 and 2012, more than half of the
528 general acute care hospital mergers involved hospitals or health systems in
different geographic areas. 20 Prominent examples of national cross-market
health care mergers include the 2014 acquisition of 71-hospital Health
Management by 135-hospital Community Health System for $3.9 billion, as
well as the 2013 merger of Dallas-based Baylor Health Care System and
Temple-based Scott White Health, creating a 43-hospital combined entity with
more than 6000 affiliated physicians. 21 However, cross-market mergers also can
be more regional, such as the growth of Sutter Health in Northern California to
dominate the areas spanning from San Francisco to Sacramento or the growth of
Partners Healthcare in Eastern Massachusetts beyond Central Boston to include

16. Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 2.
17. See Caroline S. Carlin et al., The Impact of Provider Consolidation on Physician Prices,
HEALTH ECON. 1, 2 (2017).
18. See, e.g., id.
19. Matthew S. Lewis & Kevin E. Pflum, Diagnosing Hospital System Bargaining Power in
Managed Care Networks, 7 AM. ECON. J. 243, 244 (2014).
20. Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 1 (defining geographic areas as Core Based Statistical
Areas, which are metropolitan statistical areas for larger cities and micropolitan areas for smaller
towns).
21. Id. at 1 & n.3.
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physician groups, clinics, and community hospitals spanning from Cape Cod to
New Hampshire. 22
Despite antitrust agencies’ focus on horizontal health care mergers, 23 the
trend of cross-market mergers is growing in importance. The vast majority of
hospital markets in major metropolitan areas are already highly concentrated, 24
narrowing the options for further concentration in many of those markets.
Similarly, many rural areas struggle to support more than one health system. 25
Barriers to entry also make it difficult for new firms to open new hospitals as a
means of growth. 26 As a result, cross-market mergers are likely to increasingly
dominate the growth strategy of health care providers.
Under prevailing antitrust enforcement approaches, cross-market mergers in
health care have largely escaped antitrust scrutiny. The DOJ’s and FTC’s
traditional view under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines was that mergers across
geographic markets did not affect competition because the merging firms did not
directly compete in the same geographic or product markets—they were not
substitutes at the point of service for any given patient—rendering them either
pro-competitive or competitively neutral. 27 Without economic evidence to
suggest otherwise, U.S. antitrust enforcers have been reluctant to challenge
cross-market mergers.
At the same time, growth of health care systems through acquisition (as
opposed to building new facilities) has become an industry imperative for
providers, and many of these acquisitions have occurred across geographic
markets. 28 Left unchecked, cross-market acquisitions will continue to allow

22. See DAVID DRANOVE, NAT’L INST. FOR HEALTH CARE MGMT., FEDERAL ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT IN HEALTH CARE (Mar. 2014), https://www.nihcm.org/component/content/article/
6-expert-voices/1272-federal-antitrust-enforcement?showall=1.
23. Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 10, at 254.
24. E.g., David M. Cutler & Fiona Scott Morton, Hospitals, Market Share, and Consolidation,
310 JAMA 1964, 1966 (2013) (noting that nearly half of all U.S. hospital markets are highly
concentrated); STEPHEN ZUCKERMAN & JOHN HOLAHAN, URBAN INST. HEALTH POLICY CTR.,
DESPITE CRITICISM, THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT DOES MUCH TO CONTAIN HEALTH CARE
COSTS 2 (Oct. 2012), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412665-Despite-Criticism-The-Afford
able-Care-Act-Does-Much-to-Contain-Health-Care-Cost.pdf (noting that as of the mid-2000s,
eighty-eight percent of hospital markets in large metropolitan areas are highly concentrated).
25. See KEVIN J. BENNETT ET AL., S.C. RURAL HEALTH RESEARCH CTR., VULNERABLE
RURAL COUNTIES: THE CHANGING RURAL LANDSCAPE, 2000-2010 12 (July 2016),
http://rhr.sph.sc.edu/report/(13-4)Vulnerable_Rural_Counties_The_Changing_Rural_Landscape_
2000-2010.pdf (reporting that “[m]ore than one-fourth of all remote rural counties did not have a
hospital in 2010” and there have been seventy-five additional rural hospital closures since 2010).
26. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMPETITION AND BARRIERS TO ENTRY 1
(Jan. 2007), http://www.oecd.org/competition/mergers/37921908.pdf.
27. See, e.g., Argue & Stein, supra note 11, at 25–26.
28. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
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health care systems to grow and charge excessive prices while evading antitrust
scrutiny. 29
II. THE EVIDENCE-BASED EVOLUTION OF MERGER ENFORCEMENT
PHILOSOPHY
Economics and antitrust law are inextricably linked. As the U.S. Supreme
Court noted in Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, as knowledge and
understanding of economics evolves, so should antitrust law and its
enforcement. 30 This mutual evolution of economics and antitrust law has
occurred numerous times as new developments have modified traditional
understanding of the economic impact of certain types of mergers and
acquisitions. 31 When economists evaluate a particular industry, they develop
theoretical models that attempt to capture key features of its competitive
market. 32 They then use empirical data to test their theoretical models. 33 If the
empirical data validates the model, economists can then use both the theory and
the analytical model to make predictions about the potential impact of a
particular market event, like a merger or acquisition. 34 In recent years, advances
in economic modeling of health care markets have resulted in significant
advances in the agencies’ ability to predict the impact of mergers and
acquisitions, resulting in a string of successful antitrust challenges to horizontal
health care mergers. 35 Now, economic evidence has begun to demonstrate the
anti-competitive potential of cross-market mergers in health care, and the time
has come again to consider adapting current understanding and interpretation of
antitrust law. 36 This part describes how developments in economic evidence
have historically altered antitrust analysis of horizontal and vertical mergers in
health care.
Three federal laws protect competition in American markets: the Sherman
Act, 37 the Clayton Act, 38 and the Federal Trade Commission Act. 39 Antitrust
29. See Robert A. Berenson et al., Unchecked Provider Clout in California Foreshadows
Challenges to Health Reform, 29 HEALTH AFF. 699, 702 (2010); see also Berenson et al., supra
note 3, at 976.
30. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2412–13 (2015) (The U.S. Supreme Court
stated that it has “felt relatively free to revise [its] legal analysis as economic understanding evolves
and . . . to reverse antitrust precedents that misperceived a practice’s competitive consequences.”).
31. See discussion infra Sections II.A, II.C.
32. Cory S. Capps, From Rockford to Joplin and Back Again: The Impact of Economics on
Hospital Merger Enforcement, 59 ANTITRUST BULL. 443, 447 (2014).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 444–46.
36. See e.g., Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 2; Lewis & Pflum, supra note 14, at 2–3.
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–11 (2012).
38. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012).
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–45 (2012).
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enforcers typically rely upon Section 7 of the Clayton Act to challenge mergers
and acquisitions. 40 Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits acquisitions where the
effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.” 41 In 1950, Congress amended Section 7 to broaden its applicability
from activities that lessen existing competition between the merging parties to
those that lessen competition in any line of commerce. 42 As a result, antitrust
enforcers can enjoin any merger with “probable anticompetitive effect[s].” 43
However, antitrust enforcers’ views of which mergers have sufficient potential
for anti-competitive effects to warrant a challenge have evolved over time in
tandem with developments in economic evidence.
A.

Horizontal Merger Enforcement

Antitrust enforcement tools for analyzing the potential impact of horizontal
mergers are the most well developed because the economic models and evidence
for the effects of horizontal mergers are similarly well developed. Horizontal
mergers enhance market power by eliminating competition between the parties
(“unilateral effects”), or combining assets and market share of former
competitors and facilitating collusion (“coordinated effects”). 44 As noted above,
antitrust review of horizontal mergers proceeds under Section 7 of the Clayton
40. David Narrow, Antitrust Overview, in CHRISTINE L. WHITE ET AL., ANTITRUST AND
HEALTHCARE: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE, § 2-1(a)(2) (2013).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
42. Clayton Act, ch. 1184, § 7, 64 Stat. 1125, 1125–26 (1950) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
18 (2012)).
43. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962); accord Fed. Trade Comm’n
v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967) (“All mergers are within the reach of § 7, and
all must be tested by the same standard, whether they are classified as horizontal, vertical,
conglomerate or other. As noted by the Commission, this merger is neither horizontal, vertical, nor
conglomerate. Since the products of the acquired company are complementary to those of the
acquiring company and may be produced with similar facilities, marketed through the same
channels and in the same manner, and advertised by the same media, the Commission aptly called
this acquisition a ‘product-extension merger.’”); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S.
526, 531 (1973) (citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578–80 (1967)
for the proposition that Section 7 “also bars certain acquisitions of a market competitor by a
noncompetitor, such as a merger by an entrant who threatens to dominate the market or otherwise
upset market conditions to the detriment of competition.”); id. at 556–58 (Marshall, J., concurring)
(citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967) and the 1950
amendment for the proposition that Section 7 could apply beyond the elimination of actual present
competition). European antitrust law takes a similar position; an acquisition can be prohibited when
it “creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition in the
common market or in a substantial part of it would be significantly impeded.” Council Regulation
(EC) No. 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings,
2004 O.J. (L 24) 1, 3 (discussing Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 of December 21, 1989).
44. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2
(Aug. 19, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819
hmg.pdf.
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Act. 45 Traditional horizontal merger analysis requires the enforcer to: (1) define
the market, including the product and geographic market parameters and the
barriers to entry, 46 (2) determine the market share based on revenues, 47 (3)
determine the existing market concentration and the change in market
concentration resulting from the merger via the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI), 48 (4) determine whether the merger will significantly increase
concentration in the relevant market, giving rise to a presumption of anticompetitive effects, 49 and (5) consider the balance of pro- and anti-competitive
effects of the merger, 50 including the potential for merger-specific efficiency
gains, 51 unilateral effects, 52 coordinated effects, 53 and customer or supplier
reactions. 54 Despite little doubt that horizontal mergers between direct
competitors can harm competition, application of this traditional economic and
antitrust analysis resulted in a wave of antitrust enforcement losses in hospital
merger challenges followed by more than a decade-long hiatus in health care
merger enforcement. 55
The wave of failed challenges by federal and state antitrust authorities to
horizontal provider acquisitions led to the birth of new economic studies and
analyses demonstrating how such horizontal provider mergers could lead to
price increases, with no corresponding efficiencies, under a two-stage model of
health care markets. 56 The two-stage model divides the competitive dynamic in
health care markets into two stages: the first stage in which payors bargain with
providers over inclusion in a payor’s network on both price and non-price
considerations, and the second stage in which patients pick providers primarily
based on non-price considerations. 57 Because of the ubiquity of employer-based
health coverage and managed care, large employers often sponsor their own
45. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
46. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 44, at 7–8, 13.
47. Id. at 17.
48. Id. at 18–19.
49. Id. at 3.
50. Id. at 29–31.
51. Merger-specific efficiency gains include cost savings, quality improvements, and other
pro-competitive effects. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 44, at 29–30.
52. Unilateral effects examine whether the merged firm would have the ability to increase
prices or reduce output on its own. Id. at 20.
53. Coordinated effects examine whether the merger would facilitate future collusion among
market participants. Id. at 25.
54. Id. at 14; LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, AN INTEGRATED
HANDBOOK 509 (3d ed. 2016).
55. Capps, supra note 32, at 444.
56. See, e.g., id. at 444–48, 460; see also, e.g., Steven Tenn, The Price Effects of Hospital
Mergers: A Case Study of the Sutter-Summit Transaction, 18 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 65, 71–72, 79
(2011).
57. See, e.g., Gregory Vistnes, Hospitals, Mergers, and Two-Stage Competition, 67
ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 673 (2000).
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health plans by creating or contracting with a network of providers to offer
health care services to employees. 58
The first stage does not ignore the preferences of the individual consumer.
Employers need their health plans to have provider networks robust enough for
their employees to have options for obtaining services from providers close to
where they live. 59 By shifting the focus of competitive impact from consumers
to health plans, the two-stage model illustrates how acquisitions enable health
care providers to gain leverage in their negotiations with insurers by negotiating
on an all-or-nothing basis, such that if the insurer does not accept the terms set
by the provider system, the system will prevent any of its providers from
participating in the insurer’s network. All-or-nothing negotiations threaten to
create holes in the insurer’s provider network, and a new acquisition threatens
the creation of an even larger hole thereby increasing the hospital system’s
negotiating position and market power. Further, the acquisition leaves fewer
options for insurers to turn to if the acquiring entity raises its prices postacquisition. 60
A number of economic studies have demonstrated a clear relationship
between horizontal hospital consolidation and increased prices. In a 2012 review
of the literature, Martin Gaynor and Robert Town concluded that “increases in
hospital market concentration lead to increases in the price of hospital care.” 61
Studies found that hospital mergers in concentrated markets experienced
significant price increases in excess of twenty percent compared to non-merging
control hospitals. 62 Additional studies from this time period further suggested
that hospital concentration can lead to reductions in quality. 63 Gaynor and
58. See Paul Fronstin, Self-Insured Health Plans: Recent Trends by Firm Size, EMP. BENEFIT
RES. INST. NOTES (Emp. Benefit Research Inst., Washington, D.C.), July 2016, at 2.
59. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 341–42 (3d
Cir. 2016); see also United States v. Anthem, Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 171, 196, 204, 223 (D.D.C.
2017), aff’d, 855 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
60. See, e.g., Cory Capps et al., Competition and Market Power in Option Demand Markets,
34 RAND J. ECON. 737, 757, 760 (2003).
61. MARTIN GAYNOR & ROBERT TOWN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., THE IMPACT OF
HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION—UPDATE 1 (June 2012), https://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/re
ports/issue_briefs/2012/rwjf73261.
62. Id. at 2 (reporting that “[m]erging hospitals had 40% higher prices than non-merging
hospitals”) (citing Leemore Dafny, Estimation and Identification of Merger Effects: An Application
to Hospital Mergers, 52 J.L. & ECON. 523, 544 (2009)); see also Deborah Haas-Wilson &
Christopher Garmon, Hospital Mergers and Competitive Effects: Two Retrospective Analyses, 18
INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 17, 27–30 (2011); Tenn, supra note 56, at 76 (finding that following the merger
of Summit and Sutter in California, Summit raised its prices 28.4% to 44.2% compared to the
control).
63. WILLIAM B. VOGT & ROBERT TOWN, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., HOW HAS
HOSPITAL CONSOLIDATION AFFECTED THE PRICE AND QUALITY OF HOSPITAL CARE? 9 (Feb.
2006), https://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2006/rwjf12056/subassets/rwj
f12056_1; GAYNOR & TOWN, supra note 61, at 4–5.
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Town’s synthesis of the literature in 2012 confirmed earlier studies from the
1990s and early 2000s providing evidence that hospital consolidation
significantly raised prices. 64
From this body of research, economists developed a new set of analytical
tools for assessing competition in health care markets. 65 Based on the two-stage
model of health care markets, economists developed a means to model and
empirically measure the leverage gained by providers over insurers following
horizontal provider acquisitions. 66 These analytical tools—willingness-to-pay
(WTP) analysis, hospital merger simulation, and diversion analysis—provided
a clearer understanding of how health care entities bargain, negotiate, and
compete. 67 The shift in focus from the consumer to the impact of the merger on
the health plan’s ability to negotiate with entities for inclusion in its network
greatly contributed to the agencies’ ability to more effectively enforce antitrust
laws in those markets. 68 The use of these models to analyze provider mergers
between direct competitors supported a series of decisions barring horizontal
provider mergers from federal appellate courts in the Third, 69 Sixth, 70 Seventh, 71
and Ninth Circuits. 72
B.

Vertical Merger Enforcement

Vertical merger analysis has also gained much from the shift in viewpoint
from analyzing the impact of the merger on the health care consumer to the
impact on the ability of a payor to negotiate with the merged entity for network
inclusion. Unlike horizontal mergers, vertical mergers occur between entities
that do not directly compete with one another. 73 Instead, they provide different

64. GAYNOR & TOWN, supra note 61, at 1–2.
65. Capps, supra note 32, at 446.
66. See, e.g., Capps et al., supra note 60, at 760.
67. See, e.g., Capps, supra note 32, at 446.
68. See id. at 446–47.
69. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 339–43, 340 n.3, 353
(3d Cir. 2016); Brief of Amicus Curiae Economics Professors in Support of Plaintiffs/Appellants
at 9–10, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2016) (No.
16-2365), 2016 WL 3251948, at *3.
70. ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 749 F.3d 559, 571–72 (6th Cir. 2014)
(relying on insurer testimony as to the two-stage market).
71. Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460, 465–66, 468, 470,
476 (7th Cir. 2016); Brief of Amicus Curiae Submitted by Thirty-Three Economists in Support of
the FTC and State of Illinois at 8, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d
460 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 16-2492), 2016 WL 3996861, at *6–9, *11–12, *16–17.
72. Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775, 784
& n.10, 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2015); Brief of Amicus Curiae Economics Professors in Support of
Plaintiffs/Appellees at 6, Saint Alphonsus Med. Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd.,
778 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-35173), 2014 WL 4312204, at *6.
73. WHITE ET AL., supra note 40, at § 3-6.
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but complementary elements of an economic supply chain. 74 While hospitals
and physician groups are not in a classically vertical relationship, in that
hospitals do not purchase services from physicians, physicians supply a crucial
component of hospital services, and a clear relationship exists between the two
entities. 75 Hospitals provide facilities free of charge for physicians to treat their
patients, and physicians refer their patients to hospitals. 76
The traditional view among antitrust enforcers is that vertical mergers can
promote competition (or at least be competitively neutral) because
“arrangements of integrated providers can provide tremendous procompetitive
benefits.” 77 Under optimal conditions, vertical integration should improve
product and pricing efficiency by lowering transaction costs, promoting quality
enhancement, eliminating overhead and redundancies, and improving
coordination. 78
However, the relationship between the hospital and the physician group also
has the potential to increase the market power of the merged entity vis-a-vis the
payor trying to build a network for its health plan, which can drive up health
care costs. 79 Vertical mergers can threaten competition if the merger enhances
the merged entity’s ability to foreclose competitors, engage in collusion, evade
rate regulation, or raise competitors’ costs in upstream or downstream markets. 80
Health services research in recent years supports this notion by demonstrating
that hospital acquisitions of physician groups are associated with price increases
for both the hospitals and the physicians, rather than efficiency gains. 81 These

74. Id.
75. Thomas L. Greaney & Douglas Ross, Navigating Through the Fog of Vertical Merger
Law: A Guide to Counselling Hospital-Physician Consolidation Under the Clayton Act, 91 WASH.
L. REV. 199, 206–07 (2016).
76. Id. at 206.
77. WHITE ET AL., supra note 40, at § 3-6 (quoting Christine A. Varney, Comm’r, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Remarks Before the Health Care Antitrust Forum, Chicago, Illinois (May 2, 1995)).
78. See Martin Gaynor, Is Vertical Integration Anticompetitive? Definitely Maybe (But That’s
Not Final), 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 175, 177 (2006); see also Roger D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol,
Quality-Enhancing Merger Efficiencies, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1969, 1983–84 (2015).
79. See Esther Gal-Or, The Profitability of Vertical Mergers Between Hospitals and Physician
Practices, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 623, 629 (1999).
80. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 549, 552–53.
81. See, e.g., Laurence C. Baker et al., Vertical Integration: Hospital Ownership of Physician
Practices is Associated with Higher Prices and Spending, 33 HEALTH AFF. 756, 762 (2014)
(finding hospital ownership of physicians is associated with higher hospital prices and spending);
James C. Robinson & Kelly Miller, Total Expenditures per Patient in Hospital-Owned and
Physician-Owned Physician Organizations in California, 312 JAMA 1663, 1668 (2014) (finding
hospital-owned physician organizations had ten to twenty percent higher total expenditures per
patient than physician-owned organizations); Cory Capps et al., The Effect of Hospital Acquisitions
of Physician Practices on Prices and Spending 3 (Inst. for Policy Res., Nw. U., Working Paper No.
WP-15-02, Feb. 2015) (finding that vertical integration was associated with a 13.7% increase in
physician prices); Hannah T. Neprash et al., Association of Financial Integration Between

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2017]

THE ANTI-COMPETITIVE POTENTIAL OF CROSS-MARKET MERGERS

55

studies provided evidence that the price increases driven by hospital-physician
mergers were due to the enhanced market power of the integrated provider entity
when negotiating with payors. 82
While the agencies are aware that vertical mergers can harm competition,
how to evaluate the competitive effect of a vertical health care merger remains
largely uncertain, especially in light of the potential for pro-competitive
efficiencies and the need to balance those against potential anti-competitive
harms. 83 As a result, vertical mergers in health care have rarely been challenged
directly. In Saint Alphonsus Medical Center-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health
System, Ltd., the Ninth Circuit prohibited the acquisition of Saltzer, the largest
and most prestigious group of primary care physicians in Nampa, Idaho, solely
on horizontal grounds (the merger of Saltzer with the hospital’s existing
physician group), rather than addressing the potential harms raised by the
vertical aspects of the merger. 84 While antitrust agencies have not yet brought a
pre-merger challenge to a vertical health care merger, they have imposed
behavioral conditions on vertical mergers in exchange for allowing such mergers
to proceed. 85 Through these actions, enforcers have acknowledged that vertical
mergers in health care between entities that do not compete in the same product
market can result in anti-competitive harm as a result of increased negotiating
power with payors. This development is significant because it further opens the
door to the possibility that cross-market mergers of entities with related products
that do not compete in the same product or geographic market could harm
competition.

Physicians and Hospitals with Commercial Health Care Prices, 175 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1932,
1936 (2015) (finding that metropolitan statistical areas with increases in physician-hospital
integration experienced median price increases of seventy-five dollars).
82. See Capps et al., supra note 81, at 3, 5–7, 36 (finding that physician price increases
following acquisition by hospitals were greater as the size of the acquiring hospital’s market share
increased, perhaps due to increase in willingness to pay for the integrated entity’s services);
Robinson & Miller, supra note 81, at 1668 (noting that the larger the market share of the hospitalowner, the greater the increase in per-patient expenditures due to hospital-physician integration);
Neprash et al., supra note 81, at 1937 (noting that commercial price differences were greater than
price differences for Medicare, suggesting that the price increases were the result of enhanced
market power of integrated providers, not just the fact that Medicare policy paid higher prices for
outpatient services provided by physicians acquired by hospitals).
83. See Greaney & Ross, supra note 75, at 201–02.
84. Saint Alphonsus Medical Ctr.-Nampa Inc. v. St. Luke’s Health Sys., Ltd., 778 F.3d 775,
781–82, 792–93 (9th Cir. 2015).
85. See Amended Final Order at 2, Penn. v. Geisinger Health Sys. Found., No 1:13 CV-02647YK (M.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2013); Final Order at 6–18, Penn. v. Urology of Cent. Penn., Inc., No. 1:11cv-01625-JEJ (M.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2011).
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C. Cross-Market Merger Enforcement
Like horizontal and vertical merger enforcement, antitrust enforcement of
cross-market mergers should evolve alongside current understanding of the
economic and market forces. If economic theory and empirical evidence
supported a claim that cross-market health care mergers could harm competition,
U.S. antitrust precedents would allow enforcement agencies to challenge a
particular cross-market merger that threatened harm to competition. As noted
above, Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits all mergers or other combinations
of entities where the effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly.” 86 Merger analysis turns on whether the
consolidation is likely to harm competition by enhancing the opportunity for
collusion or enabling the resulting entity to exercise market power through
increasing prices, restraining output, or stifling innovation. 87
One mechanism by which cross-market mergers can harm both consumers
and competition is through anti-competitive tying. Tying arrangements occur
when the seller of multiple goods and services conditions the sale of one good
or service (“the tying product”) on the purchase of another good or service (“the
tied product”). 88 The essence of an antitrust tying claim is that the seller is using
its market power in the tying product market to influence sales in the tied product
market. 89 In a cross-market merger, in which a hospital system acquires another
hospital in a different geographic market, the potential for tying arises when the
newly merged entity then negotiates with insurance companies on an all-ornothing basis, such that an insurer must include all of the hospital system’s
providers in its network or none at all. Large, multi-hospital systems often
include hospitals or provider organizations that are “must have” entities, such
that an insurer could not build a successful network without them. 90 Must-have
providers generate significant market power for their health systems, which can
extend to all other providers within the system via contracting. 91 For instance,
large hospital systems that engage in “all-or-nothing” contracting have
reportedly added anti-tiering provisions to their contracts with payors to prevent
the payor from accepting all system providers at inflated rates and then
developing tiered benefit packages that incentivize plan participants to select

86. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
87. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 2
(Aug. 19, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819
hmg.pdf.
88. WHITE ET AL., supra note 40, at § 9-2(c).
89. Id.
90. See Robert A. Berenson et al., The Growing Power of Some Providers to Win Steep
Payment Increases from Insurers Suggests Policy Remedies May Be Needed, 31 HEALTH AFF. 973,
973 (2012).
91. See id. at 973, 978.
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lower priced alternatives. 92 The possibility of anti-competitive tying exists when
a health system spans several geographic and product markets and contracts with
insurers or customers that also span those markets. 93
While tying claims are most frequently brought under Sherman Act Section
1 which prohibits contracts “in restraint of trade,” 94 the probable anticompetitive effects resulting from tying can justify a merger challenge under the
Clayton Act Section 7. 95 Section 7 does not require proof of anti-competitive
behavior but rather permits courts to predict the likely competitive impact of a
proposed merger or acquisition based on past conduct, present facts, and
economic modeling. Courts only require evidence of a probable future adverse
impact on competition. 96 Therefore, if economic theory and research support a
claim that a cross-market merger posed a substantial threat to competition, the
agencies would have the legal basis to bring a pre-merger challenge.
III. THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL BASES FOR CONSIDERING THE ANTICOMPETITIVE POTENTIAL OF CROSS-MARKET MERGERS IN HEALTH CARE
Traditionally, antitrust challenges to cross-market mergers were not
viable, regardless of whether the case law would permit such a challenge,
because of the paucity of economic theory and empirical data to support the
notion that cross-market mergers could be anti-competitive. This state of affairs,
however, is ripe for review.
Recent breakthroughs in health economics offer both theoretical and
empirical descriptions of how cross-market acquisitions in health care can
increase prices when a common insurer or common customer purchases products
or services supplied by both entities. 97 First, Vistnes and Sarafidis modeled how
a hospital system can, as a theoretical matter, increase prices after acquiring
providers in a different geographic market. 98 In 2016, Dafny, Ho, and Lee
expanded upon Vistnes and Sarafidis’ model and findings from Ho and Lee’s
earlier research, 99 demonstrating that the merger of hospitals in different
92. Glenn A. Melnick & Katya Fonkych, Hospital Prices Increase in California, Especially
Among Hospitals in the Largest Multi-Hospital Systems, 53 INQUIRY 1, 5 (2016).
93. As Part II discusses, anti-competitive tying is not the only mechanism through which a
cross-market merger could harm competition, but it currently is the best understood one. See infra
Part II.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
95. Id. at § 18.
96. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962); Peter C. Carstensen, The
Philadelphia National Bank Presumption: Merger Analysis in an Unpredictable World, 80
ANTITRUST L.J. 219, 239–40 (2015).
97. See, e.g., Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 10, at 260; Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at
29.
98. Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 10, at 293.
99. Kate Ho & Robin S. Lee, Insurer Competition in Healthcare Markets (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 19401, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19401.pdf.
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geographic markets could influence insurer reimbursement rates if those insurers
had customers (employers) who employed workers in both markets. 100 Dafny,
Ho, and Lee theorized that cross-market health care mergers could have anticompetitive effects if the health care system and the acquired provider: (1)
bargained with common insurers for network inclusion; and/or (2) had
customers in common, i.e., firms with employees in both markets. 101 The anticompetitive potential results from the ability of the newly merged entity to sell
(or refuse to sell) both the products in ways that increase the utility of (or
disutility of not) having both products beyond the sum of their independent
utilities. 102 In many respects, this resembles anti-competitive tying. Additional
studies by Matthew Lewis and Kevin Pflum, and Glenn Melnick and Katya
Fonkych also provide empirical evidence that cross-market mergers can be anticompetitive. 103
To understand the joint utility loss, imagine that you must choose a health
plan for your family, and you care most about a network that covers both your
kids’ pediatrician and your cardiologist. A plan that includes both is the most
desirable, a plan that includes one or the other has slightly less value, but you
will not accept a plan that includes neither. A plan that includes both the
pediatrician and the cardiologist would provide the most utility, whereas a plan
with neither would have even less utility than the sum of the utility lost in plans
that lacked either the pediatrician or the cardiologist. Dafny, Ho, and Lee call
this the “common customer effect.” 104
The common customer effect is experienced by large employers and
insurance companies that must negotiate reimbursement rates with merging
health care providers. Employers with employees working across numerous
geographic markets seek plans with networks that provide the greatest value
across all markets. To these employers, the overall provider bundle or network
is the product, such that they consider whether one provider bundle is
substitutable for another rather than any particular provider in one geographic
market. 105 As a result, insurers have incentives to build networks that include
key providers for employers even when they are not in the same geographic

100. Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 2–3.
101. Id. at 5–6.
102. See id. at 5.
103. Lewis & Pflum, supra note 14, at 603–04; Melnick & Fonkych, supra note 92, at 6.
104. Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 9–11. Dafny, Ho, and Lee also hypothesized that the
same theory would also apply when there are no common customers but instead common insurers—
the common insurer effect. Id. at 12. In this scenario, cross-market mergers could enable a hospital
system to recoup revenues lost due to political or legislative constraints in one market (caps on
increases) by acquiring a hospital in a non-constrained market, and then increasing rates in the nonconstrained hospital and requiring all insurers to include both hospitals in their networks. Id. at 12,
14.
105. See id. at 2.
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market. Similar to the example above, an acquisition linking two hospitals in
distinct geographic markets together for negotiating purposes could make the
loss of both hospitals from the network greater than the sum of the losses of each
hospital independently in the absence of the acquisition. 106 This effect can
manifest through health plan premiums as the health plan must either raise
premiums to accommodate the increased provider costs from the merged entity
or lower premiums to account for the holes in the network and compromise
health plan profits. 107 As a result, for example, a large health care system in
Northern California with market power in one or more counties could require
insurers, such as Aetna or Blue Shield, to include newly-acquired providers in
Central and Southern California in their networks at increased prices. The
newly-acquired providers could raise prices by taking advantage of the
bargaining leverage of the acquiring health care system, which stems from the
threat of more significant network holes if the system leaves a provider network
en masse. 108 Importantly, the common customer effect results from a change in
the parties’ bargaining options, not from increased negotiating skill, which
opens the door to antitrust enforcement. 109
Over time, aspects of this theory have been borne out both theoretically and
empirically. To test their hypotheses, Dafny, Ho, and Lee examined two distinct
samples of acute care hospital mergers over the period of 1996 to 2010 and the
price trajectories after those mergers for three groups of hospitals: “(i) hospitals
acquiring a new system member in the same state but not the same narrow
geographic market (‘adjacent treatment hospitals’); (ii) hospitals acquiring a
new system member out of state (‘non-adjacent treatment hospitals’); and (iii)
hospitals that are not members of ‘target’ (i.e., acquired) or acquiring
systems.” 110 Dafny, Ho, and Lee found that a merger between hospitals in
different geographic regions within the same state with common customers or
common insurers led to significant price increases of seven to ten percent
compared with control hospitals that were not part of a merger. 111 The authors
observed this price effect in “bystander” hospitals, which were part of the

106. See id. at 4.
107. Argue & Stein, supra note 11, at 28; see also Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 36.
Interestingly, the economists appear to differ on the underlying mechanism resulting in the ability
of cross-market mergers to compromise health plan profits. Dafny, Ho, and Lee argue that it results
from a “change in parties’ outside options (or threat points) when bargaining.” Id. at 4. Lewis and
Pflum contend that the increase in bargaining power results from system membership either via allor-nothing bargaining or altering the bargaining power of a particular hospital in the system. See
Lewis & Pflum, supra note 14, at 602. Regardless of the mechanism, the ability to create network
holes and demand higher reimbursements remains.
108. See Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 6, 12.
109. See id. at 4.
110. Id. at 3.
111. Id.
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merging system, but not the “crown jewel” motivating the acquisitions. 112 The
closer in geographic proximity the merging parties were to each other, the larger
the price effects. 113 The price effects of the cross-market health care mergers
provide empirical evidence that the health system’s market power increases
when it adds more providers due to the ability to tie (or “pull through”) the
system’s acquired providers to its strongest “must-have” providers when
bargaining with health plans. Correspondingly, increasing the number of
preferred providers in a system increases the number and significance of
network holes the merged health system can threaten if the health plan does not
accept the health system’s higher prices.
Dafny, Ho, and Lee’s seminal study is not an outlier. An earlier study by
Lewis and Pflum estimated that health care systems can raise prices more for an
acquired provider in a different geographic market than a comparable hospital
does when it acquires a close competitor within the same market. 114 In other
words, Lewis and Pflum found that cross-market provider acquisitions in some
instances could lead to greater price increases and thus be more anti-competitive
than even horizontal provider acquisitions involving direct competitors. Lewis
and Pflum then released a second study further evaluating the price effects from
cross-market acquisitions, which found that “prices at hospitals acquired by outof-market systems increased by about 17% more than unacquired, stand-alone
hospitals.” 115
Furthermore, Melnick and Fonkych, in their study of hospital prices in
California, found that “the market power effects of large hospital systems do not
necessarily require consolidation between local competitors.” 116 Their study
revealed that many of the hospitals in California’s largest systems do not
substantially overlap with other system hospitals in terms of product and
geographic markets. 117 The authors concluded that “hospitals in large hospital

112. Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 17.
113. Id. at 3, 25. This study also theorized that due to the double-marginalization problem, the
health care system’s acquisition of a provider in a new geographic market might allow it to retain
profits that it would otherwise cede to insurers and thereby raise prices. See id. at 12–13.
114. Lewis & Pflum, supra note 19, at 244, 246; see id. at 248–57 (modeling based on the
auction model used for horizontal provider mergers to value access to hospitals on an estimate of
the cost function for multi-product firms in general and hospitals, and on bargaining models, in
turn, based on the assumption that insurers try to get nearly every hospital into their networks); id.
at 257 (using data from sources such as the American Hospital Association and the California
Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development); id. at 266 (“Our results also indicate that,
in addition to improving their bargaining position by increasing concentration within a local patient
market, system hospitals have significantly higher bargaining power and extract roughly 30 percent
more of the surplus generated by the hospital-[insurer] relationship than comparable nonsystem
hospitals.”).
115. Lewis & Pflum, supra note 14, at 579.
116. Melnick & Fonkych, supra note 92, at 6.
117. Id.
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systems, by tying their hospitals together, are able to achieve market power over
prices beyond any local market advantages.” 118 While these findings advance
understanding of the economic underpinnings of the U.S. health care system,
whether antitrust enforcers can use these findings to address the anti-competitive
effects of cross-market acquisitions by health care systems remains a legal
question for enforcers and courts to resolve.
IV. THE POTENTIAL FOR CROSS-MARKET ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
Even with new economic evidence suggesting that cross-market mergers
have the potential to harm competition in health care markets and a legal
foundation for bringing a claim, bringing a successful cross-market merger
challenge is easier said than done. Several economic and legal hurdles remain.
First, some skepticism in academic and enforcement circles remains about
whether cross-market mergers can be anti-competitive. 119 Second, an antitrust
enforcer seeking to challenge a cross-market merger must convince her
colleagues that the proposed merger presents a significantly higher risk to
competition than other potential health care merger challenges as to warrant use
of scarce agency resources on a case with a less clearly trodden path through
litigation. Third, while the Clayton Act provides a legal basis to challenge a
cross-market merger, 120 successfully litigating the suit will require the
development of new economic and legal analytic frameworks and tools for
analyzing the potential impact of a cross-market merger to the provider system’s
ability to negotiate prices with insurers and employers. As economists continue
to conduct research on cross-market mergers and develop models to determine
their potential impact, the legal academy and antitrust enforcers should similarly
evaluate this research to determine whether and how a cross-market merger
challenge should be brought. As economists, lawyers, and academics develop
the economic and legal tools needed to build a strong cross-market merger
challenge and overcome the third hurdle, the first two hurdles should diminish
substantially. As the economic analysis increasingly demonstrates the anticompetitive potential of certain cross-market mergers, skepticism will diminish,
and the relative importance of bringing a challenge will increase. The rest of this
section highlights areas for further consideration, research, and analysis.

118. Id. The authors noted that their study did not control for quality, technological, and
financial differences between the hospitals in large systems and other hospitals, but their study did
include quality differences at the end, which had a minimal effect on price differences. Id.
119. See, e.g., Argue & Stein, supra note 11, at 25.
120. See supra Section I.C.
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Reframing Traditional Merger Analysis

Typically, in hospital mergers, courts examine the impact of the merger in
terms of its impact on the relevant product and geographic markets. 121 For
instance, the acquisition of an additional hospital by a large, multi-hospital
system could be analyzed in terms of its impact on the price for acute care
services (the product market) in Marin County, California (the geographic
market). However, the analysis should shift when analyzing cross-market
mergers, as the merging entities do not compete in the same product and
geographic markets. Instead, antitrust enforcers should consider analyzing the
merger based on the potential direct effect it might have on the value of the
bundle of services offered by the hospital system to insurers for inclusion in their
network. For the Common Customer or Common Insurer, what matters is the
market leverage gained by the merged health care entity in terms of negotiating
reimbursement rates and network inclusion. How much does the addition of the
entity being acquired increase the bargaining position of the acquiring system
when negotiating with insurers and employers? Just as the value of adding an
additional player to a basketball team depends on the player’s skills, who else is
on the team, and the existing team chemistry, the value of adding a provider to
an existing system will depend not only on the value of the entity being acquired
itself, but also on the value of the other individual entities in the acquiring system
and the overarching value of the entire post-merger entity. To determine the
impact on market power and competition, antitrust enforcers should develop a
means to determine the value of a particular acquisition to an entire system—to
show the relative value of the target entity in the market (its market power) and
then how much value it adds to the system given the other entities in the system,
and the cumulative loss experienced by an insurer or employer from not having
any of those entities in its network.
Developing such a valuation mechanism will be challenging and must factor
in an array of conditions. For instance, state network adequacy laws can
significantly affect the value of a particular acquisition to a health system and
should be factored into any analysis. 122 Relatedly, the status of an entity as a
“must have” provider, one that is essential to a network, can strongly affect the

121. E.g., WHITE ET AL., supra note 40, at 67–68.
122. Network adequacy laws regulate health plans’ ability to provide enrollees with timely and
reasonably close access to a sufficient number of in-network primary care and specialty physicians,
and hospital and other health care services included under the terms of the contract. See, e.g., Ashley
Noble, Insurance Carriers and Access to Health Care Providers: Network Adequacy, NAT’L CONF.
ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 13, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/insurance-carriers-and-ac
cess-to-healthcare-providers-network-adequacy.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2017). More stringent
network adequacy requirements mean that the value of any essential provider or group of physicians
will increase if they cannot be excluded from the insurer’s network under the state requirements.
See, e.g., id.
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market power of the acquiring merged health system. 123 Furthermore, the value
analysis should be able to model the value of a particular acquisition in two
alternate conditions: (1) in the instance that the merged system engages in allor-nothing bargaining and (2) in the instance that the merged system allows
insurers and employers to contract for services from its subsidiary entities
individually. In sum, the value analysis will require economic modeling that
accounts for both the complexities in cross-market mergers as well as the legally
relevant variables in any particular case.
B.

Model Insurer Willingness to Pay in Cross-Market Mergers

Successful merger challenges typically require economic modeling to
predict the impact of the merger on the relevant market. Historically, most
research examining the impact of provider consolidation on health care prices
focused on traditional horizontal mergers. 124 Initially, these studies examined
the relationship between prices and market concentration, usually measured by
the HHI. 125 More recent studies utilized structural models that account for the
fact that provider reimbursement rates often result from complex negotiations
between providers (hospitals or hospitals systems) and managed care
organizations. 126 These structural models value the market power of a particular

123. Morgan A. Muir et al., Clarifying Costs: Can Increased Price Transparency Reduce
Healthcare Spending? 4 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 319, 329, 353 (2013).
124. E.g., Lewis & Pflum, supra note 14, at 579–80; see also, e.g., David Dranove et al., Price
and Concentration in Hospital Markets: The Switch from Patient-Driven to Payer-Driven
Competition, J.L. & ECON. 179, 180–81 (1993); William J. Lynk, The Creation of Economic
Efficiencies in Hospital Mergers, 14 J. HEALTH ECON. 507, 507–09 (1995); David Dranove &
Richard Ludwick, Competition and Pricing by Nonprofit Hospitals: A Reassessment of Lynk’s
Analysis, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 87, 87–88 (1995); Alison Evans Cuellar & Paul J. Gertler, How the
Expansion of Hospital Systems Has Affected Consumers, 24 HEALTH AFF. 213, 213–15 (2005);
Glenn Melnick & Emmett Keeler, The Effects of Multi-Hospital Systems on Hospital Prices, 26 J.
HEALTH ECON. 400, 401 (2007).
125. HHI is calculated as the sum of the squared market share of each entity or health system
in a given market multiplied by 10,000. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (July
29, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index (last visited Oct. 13, 2017). For
hospitals, market share is calculated as proportional share of inpatient admissions or patient days
possessed by a hospital relative the rest of the market. See Lewis & Pflum, supra note 14, at 597.
Typically, a market is considered “highly concentrated” if the HHI is greater than 2500, which
means there are about four equal sized hospital owners in a given market. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
supra. A market is “moderately concentrated” if its HHI is between 1500 and 2500. Id.
126. E.g., Lewis & Pflum, supra note 14, at 579–80; see also, e.g., John M. Brooks et al.,
Hospital-Insurer Bargaining: An Empirical Investigation of Appendectomy Pricing, 16 J. HEALTH
ECON. 417, 418–19 (1997); Robert Town & Gregory Vistnes, Hospital Competition in HMO
Networks, 20 J. HEALTH ECON. 733, 734 (2001); Capps et al., supra note 60, at 737–39; Katherine
Ho, Insurer-Provider Networks in the Medical Care Market, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 393 (Mar.
2009); Lewis & Pflum, supra note 19, at 245; Gautam Gowrisankaran et al., Mergers when Prices
Are Negotiated: Evidence from the Hospital Industry, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 172, 173 (Jan. 2015).
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provider organization based on a managed care enrollee’s “willingness to pay,”
which evaluates how much more the enrollee would be willing to pay to have
access to that hospital as opposed to going to the next best alternative for care. 127
These models have become widely adopted by antitrust authorities in evaluating
the impact of potential hospital and health system mergers. 128
WTP analysis helps elucidate the two mechanisms by which hospital system
formation can affect the negotiated price. 129 First, when hospitals merge into a
system, they typically negotiate with insurers and managed care organizations
on an all-or-nothing basis, such that the insurer must include all member
hospitals into its networks or none at all. 130 When the merging hospitals are in a
single geographic market, all-or-nothing bargaining means that enrollees cannot
substitute one hospital for another in the system, thereby limiting their options.
This makes the option value of having access to all hospitals in the system
greater than the sum of the option values for having access to only one of the
system hospitals if the other hospitals remained in the network. 131 Second,
membership in a health system can alter the bargaining power of a member
hospital. 132 This increase in bargaining power can result from system
membership via improved information on prior contract negotiations and gained
knowledge of agreements between the system and the insurer or employer
regarding other providers in the system, and increased negotiating skill. 133
Both of these mechanisms can also affect price negotiations in cross-market
mergers involving health systems. First, cross-market mergers can alter the
bargaining position of the acquiring health system when negotiating with a large
employer with employees in different markets or their insurer. 134 While
individual enrollees will not view providers in different markets as substitutable,
a large employer or an insurance company looking to build an attractive network
for a large employer will highly value a health system with providers in all the
markets where its employees live. 135 Second, the same potential benefits from
improved information, negotiating skill, capital access, and knowledge of prior
127. See Lewis & Pflum, supra note 19, at 244.
128. E.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Advocate Health Care Network, 841 F.3d 460, 476 (7th Cir.
2016); Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 342, 353 (3d Cir. 2016);
ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 749 F.3d 559, 567 (6th Cir. 2014); Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 852 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1086 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
129. Matthew Lewis & Kevin Pflum, Hosptial Systems and Bargaining Power: Evidence from
Out-of-Market Acquisitions 7 (Aug. 25, 2014) (working paper), http://www.unc.edu/~mcmanusb/
AppliedMicroSeminar/papers/Lewis_Pflum_hosp_bp.pdf.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 8.
133. See id.
134. See Vistnes & Sarafides, supra note 10, at 275; see also Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9,
at 2.
135. Lewis & Pflum, supra note 129, at 7–8.
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and current contract terms can shift the bargaining power, and therefore the
negotiated prices for newly-acquired member hospitals even if they are crossmarket acquisitions. 136
Unfortunately, initial models of WTP, based on the impact of system
inclusion on an individual consumer, do not capture the potential anticompetitive effects that may arise from cross-market mergers, as a particular
consumer may not value the addition of providers in a different geographic
area. 137 Existing studies and recent antitrust analysis “assume[] that bargaining
power is fixed and that enrollee willingness to pay is derived only from local
hospital and market characteristics.” 138 Under this assumption, the insurer’s
WTP objective function is linear, and only mergers between hospitals that
compete within the same geographic and product market can result in a price
increase. 139 However, the research by Dafny, Ho, and Lee, and Lewis and Pflum
cast doubt on the assumption that the insurer’s WTP for a particular provider is
in fact linear. Instead, their data suggested that the insurer’s WTP objective
function would be concave in this scenario, enabling both within-market and
cross-market mergers between hospitals sharing a common customer to result in
higher WTP by insurers and price increases. 140 The emerging economic
evidence thus suggests that WTP analysis could be revised to encompass crossmarket health care mergers by shifting from a fixed to a dynamic model of
bargaining power that can encompass multiple markets.
Health economists working in this area should begin testing and validating
the WTP models proposed by Dafny, Ho, and Lee, and determining whether the
model applies to geographic cross-market hospital mergers, as well as health
system acquisitions of physician groups. They should also try to incorporate
legally relevant variables such as network adequacy laws and state insurance
requirements. Further refining the economic models also offers the opportunity
to develop potential limiting principles that will help identify anti-competitive
cross-market mergers.
C. Develop Limiting Principles
Key limiting principles would delineate when cross-market acquisitions by
provider systems should be proscribed under the antitrust laws as having likely
anti-competitive effects. To trigger legal intervention and potential antitrust
remedies, price increases must be due to abuses of market power, rather than
quality improvements, better negotiating skills of the merged entity, greater

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

See id. at 8.
See id. at 2.
Id. at 8.
Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 8.
Id. at 5.
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ability to bear risk, or other legitimate drivers of price. 141 Health economists,
legal academics, and antitrust enforcers should identify and test limiting
principles to isolate acquisitions that are likely to have anti-competitive effects
from those that are likely to have pro-competitive or neutral effects. Such
limiting principles would provide important guidance to both antitrust enforcers
and the health care community, and help avoid unnecessary costs and ineffectual
results. 142
Several potential limiting principles have already arisen in economic
research and case law. First, Dafny, Ho, and Lee’s research suggests that there
must be a common customer with employees or insureds that span the markets
served by the merging entities. 143 Second, existing case law and economic
research also recommend considering whether the acquiring entity had market
power in one or more markets prior to the acquisition. 144 Researchers and
141. See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 54, at 30–31.
142. See Eric A. Posner, Fiona Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the AntiCompetitive Power of Institutional Investors, ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 9–10,
46–47) (advocating that hedge fund investment in oligopolistic industries be barred under Section
7 only if certain limiting principles are not present and noting that such principles are needed to
avoid vast costs and uncertainty or ineffectual outcomes).
143. Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 5–6; see also Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 10, at
274–75, 282 (discussing bargaining in a post cross-market acquisition situation where common
employers are involved that must offer plans covering all their employees at the same price, no
matter where those employees live in a state).
144. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 558–59 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION SUBMISSION FOR OECD ROUNDTABLE
ON PORTFOLIO EFFECTS IN CONGLOMERATE MERGERS 20 (2001), https://www.justice.gov/sites/
default/files/atr/legacy/2015/01/26/9550.pdf (noting that any theory of competitive harm from
tying in the General Electric-Honeywell merger depended on General Electric having market power
in the market for large aircraft engines); Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 29 (“Prior researchers
have shown that mergers of nearby, similar rivals can lead to increases in market power and higher
prices. The existence of a common customer effect implies that market power may arise from
combinations over even broader geographic areas and across product markets. This ﬁnding does
not imply more expansive boundaries for mechanical calculations of market shares and ‘∆HHI’s
used to evaluate whether mergers are likely to be anticompetitive; rather, we believe it favors an
emphasis on the ‘direct effects’ likely to arise from a merger, a concept promulgated in the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines.”); Lewis & Pflum, supra note 129, at 3 (“Together the ﬁndings
reveal that systems can have a signiﬁcant impact on the market power of hospitals in ways that
have not been studied or taken into consideration in recent antitrust analysis.”); id. at 37–38 (“Taken
together, these ﬁndings indicate that there are important cross-market dependencies present in the
market allowing hospitals to gain market power vis-à-vis MCOs in the price negotiation game by
joining an out-of-market system.”); see also Einer Elhauge, Rehabilitating Jefferson Parish: Why
Ties Without a Substantial Foreclosure Share Should Not Be Per Se Legal, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 463,
505–06 (2016) (tying firm with market power in the tying market adversely impacts consumer
welfare even if that tying conduct only impacts a non-trivial amount of sales in the tied product
market); Christopher R. Leslie, Tying Conspiracies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2247, 2262 (2007)
(explaining how tying conspiracies can allow firms with individually small market shares to
exercise market power in the aggregate).
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antitrust enforcers should consider whether designating a threshold of market
power, such as thirty percent, would prove valuable to identifying cross-market
acquisitions that substantially threaten competition, and are worthwhile to
challenge. Dafny, Ho, and Lee do not suggest that a market share threshold is
required for anti-competitive effects to be likely. However, antitrust enforcers
may want to designate a market share threshold for practical purposes to help
them identify the mergers that pose the most risk to competition. Third, due to
state insurance laws that govern network adequacy, institute coverage mandates,
and regulate insurance more generally, examining cross-market acquisitions of
providers within the same state as the health care system may be a good starting
point for analysis. 145 This is not to say that only same-state, cross-market
mergers can be anti-competitive, but initially this restriction may help simplify
the analysis. Interestingly, Dafny, Ho, and Lee found that the closer the hospitals
were “in terms of drive time,” the more likely employers are to have employees
living in both locations or commuting between them. 146 Disentangling the
effects of driving distance from the effects of same-state acquisitions will prove
very important in terms of limiting principles, as large employers often employ
workers across state lines at distances that may be much smaller than the
distance between merging entities in the same state. Antitrust enforcers, legal
academics, and health economists should begin evaluating potential limiting
principles to help develop the required legal framework for bringing a crossmarket challenge.
CONCLUSION
As understanding of the forces that shape health care markets evolve, so
should the ability to protect those markets from anti-competitive behaviors. Now
that economic research has provided empirical and theoretical support for the
claim that cross-market mergers have the potential to lead to increased market
power and increased prices, the time has come for the antitrust community to
begin to evaluate this claim. Health care consolidation is a leading driver of
health care costs in the United States. 147 To develop effective health care reform,
policymakers must have an understanding of all the ways that consolidation can
influence market power and increase costs. Health economists, legal academics,
and antitrust enforcers should begin examining this research to determine
whether, under what circumstances, and how challenges to cross-market
145. See Vistnes & Sarafidis, supra note 10, at 292–93 (expressing doubt that the implications
of the author’s modeling could apply to interstate cross-market acquisitions); cf. Fed. Trade
Comm’n v. Sysco Corp., 113 F. Supp. 3d 1, 49 (D.D.C. 2015) (finding both a nationwide market
for food broadline distribution based on the shared characteristics of a core group of customers as
well as intrastate local markets for food broadline distribution for other customers based on driving
time).
146. Dafny, Ho & Lee, supra note 9, at 26.
147. See, e.g., GAYNOR & TOWN, supra note 61, at 1.
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mergers should be brought to promote and protect competition in health care.
This article outlines the hurdles to bringing such a challenge and identifies
potential limiting factors for consideration. Developing the legal and economic
frameworks needed to bring an antitrust enforcement suit will take time and
cooperation, and the antitrust community should begin addressing these
concerns now, before the consolidation further harms U.S. health care markets
and increases costs.

